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NRA v. City of Chicago
Does the Second Amendment Bind Frank Easterbrook?
Richard A. Epstein*
Abstract
In NRA v. City of Chicago, Judge Easterbrook held that the Second
Amendment, which protects the right to keep and bear arms, did not bind state
governments. This article examines the reasoning that he uses to reach that result,
which it contrasts with the style of argumentation that led to the opposite
conclusion in Judge O’Scannlain’s decision in Norkdye v. King. Easterbrook’s
approach emphasized the imperative need for lower court deference to the Supreme
Court’s explicit Reconstruction Era holdings that the Second Amendment does not
bind the states, even after the Supreme Court’s game‐changing decision in District of
Columbia V. Heller and thus gave only scant attention to the various historical
authorities that O’Scannlain referred to in Nordyke. On balance it appears that
Easterbrook is against incorporation on a variety of historical and federalism
grounds, none of which are likely to prevail when the Supreme Court addresses the
issue of incorporation when it hears the case later in the 2009 October Term.

There is little doubt that Frank Easterbrook will go down as one of the great
appellate judges in the history of the United States. As those of us who know him
well can testify, he is a judge who brings his immense intelligence and fierce
dedication to his judicial work. Easterbrook also produces opinions that are always
a pleasure to read – short and incisive, without pointless verbiage. One can disagree
with their conclusion. But it is impossible to mistake their meaning. I agree whole‐
heartedly with just about everything he writes on a wide range of issues that deal
with antitrust, contracts, corporations and securities law. I have had more
disagreements on his approach to constitutional law. Easterbrook does not like, nor
does he need praise. So I shall write about constitutional law.

*

James Parker Hall Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Chicago, The Peter and Kirsten
Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, and a visiting professor of Law, New York University
School of Law. I would like to thank Caroline Van Ness, NYU Law School, Class of 2011, for her valuable
research assistance.
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Easterbrook sports a distinctive approach to constitutional law whose key
elements quickly come to the surface in his powerful, but ultimately unpersuasive,
opinion in National Rifle Association v. City of Chicago (NRA)1 on which the Supreme
Court has granted certiorari.2 Because stare decisis casts a powerful spell over
Easterbrook’s work, NRA is in some sense an aberration: for a man accustomed to
blunt talking, it is not clear whether Easterbrook agrees with his own argument.
More specifically, Easterbrook sounds two separate themes in NRA that point in
radically different directions. The first speaks of the reflexive institutional deference
that all inferior court judges should show on matters on which the Supreme Court
has spoken. On this issue, Easterbrook deploys his powerful pen in the defense of
the rule that explicit holdings must be followed even if, in the interim, subsequent
Supreme Court decisions have ripped its constitutional foundations to shreds. The
second of his arguments goes to the merits of the underlying dispute on whether the
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms applies to the states through the
action of the Fourteenth Amendment. It takes little imagination to see that the first
point only invites the Supreme Court to consider the entire matter, while the second
demands an exhaustive review of the historical arguments for and against
incorporation, which will necessarily range far afield after the Court’s key decision
in District of Columbia v. Heller.3 As everyone by now knows, the Second
Amendment, which Easterbrook does not bother to quote in NRA, is drafted like the
topic of a bad law school examination question when it states that: “A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”4 Heller read the Amendment to protect the
right of an individual to keep and bear arms within his own home. In order to reach
that conclusion, Justice Scalia had to treat the initial thirteen words of the
Amendment as precatory, after which he concluded that the substantive command
in the remainder of the text created an individual right that could only be limited by
a showing of some state interest stronger than any normally required under the
1

567 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted .
McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., --- S.Ct. ----, 2009 WL 1631802, (U.S. Sep 30, 2009) (NO. 08-1521)
3
____ U.S. ____, 128 S Ct 2783 (2008).
4
U.S. Const. Amend. II.
2
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rational basis test.5 Judge Easterbrook did not, and would not, pause to inquire into
the soundness of Heller, which I think is subject to many weaknesses.6
Academic writers don’t take marching orders from the Supreme Court so
they can address the question without risking court martial. In my view, the key
concern here is that the initial clause in speaking about a well‐regulated militia
addresses the ability of states to organize local military operations in ways that
resist overreaching by the federal government. As such, the Amendment has to bind
only the federal government. That point was held explicitly in United States v.
Cruikshank,7 and, more significantly, in Presser v. Illinois,8 which reads the Second
Amendment as part of the overall Constitutional scheme including the division of
authority set out in Article I, § 8 of the Constitution.9 Under this approach, ironically,
the only place to which the Second Amendment does not apply is Washington D.C.,
where there is no state militia of any sort to regulate. Justice Scalia necessarily
rejects that argument by stripping the preamble of any substantive bite. Once that
decision is settled in the wrong way, incorporation against the states surges to the
top of the agenda. In order to see Easterbrook’s constitutional style in action, it is
instructive to contrast his view on both topics with the far longer and more complex
decision of Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain in Nordyke v. King,10 which went quickly to
the substantive issues and found that the Second Amendment did bind the states as
a regulator, but did not limit its power to exclude guns from county fair grounds
which it owned and operated.11 Let us take the two points up in order.
I. SHOULD

THE

CIRCUIT COURTS REVISIT

THE

INCORPORATION QUESTION

Easterbrook’s opening gambit shows his keen awareness of his circumscribed role
as an appellate court judge. He thus quotes Supreme Court precedent to the effect
that lower court judges are duty bound to apply holdings that are squarely on point
5

Heller 128 S Ct 2817, at note 27.
For an account see, Richard A. Epstein, A Structural Interpretation of the Second Amendment: Why
Heller Is (Probably) Wrong on Originalist Grounds, 59 Syracuse L Rev 171 (2008).
7
92 US 542 (1876).
8
116 US 252 (1886),
9
U.S. Const. Art. I, §8, cls. 16 & 17 (outlining coordination mechanisms between the United States and the
various states).
10
563 F3d 429 (9th Cir 2009).
11
Id. at 2817, note 27, cited in Nordyke, 563 F3d at 458.
6
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“even if the reasoning in later opinions has undermined their rationale.”12 To say
that subsequent decisions have “undermined” the logic of Cruikshank and Presser is
to belittle the huge constitutional top‐to‐bottom revolution that took place over the
course of more than 100 years. Cruikshank was a Reconstruction Era decision in
which the federal government sought to prosecute for conspiracy a group of white
individuals for their efforts to “hinder” the assertion of rights, including the right to
keep and bear arms, by southern blacks guaranteed to them under the Privileges of
Immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: “no state shall make or enforce
any law that abridges the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United
States.” These broad words had been narrowly read in the then‐recent authority of
the SlaughterHouse Cases,13 which concerned the validity of a statutory monopoly
afforded by the state of Louisiana to the Crescent City Live‐Stock Landing and
Slaughter‐House Company. According to Justice Miller, that clause only applied to
the rights that persons had as federal citizens, most notably to petition the United
States for redress of grievances under the first Amendment.14 After Cruikshank, the
tragic effect of SlaughterHouse was to sharply limit federal criminal oversight on
local governments in the South through a decision that held that none of the Bill of
Rights to the United States, including Second Amendment, was binding on the
states.15 In three years, we moved from a potential economic risk to a breakdown in
constitutional government. But for Easterbrook these epochal institutional matters
do not inform the discussion. To him the key point was the explicit holding on
incorporation. It did not matter that the only Clause the Supreme Court considered
in Cruikshank was the Privileges Or Immunities Clause. Nor did it matter that within
a generation, the Supreme Court recouped much of the ground that had been ceded
in SlaughterHouse by starting to read the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to incorporate a wide range of rights found in the Bill of Rights against

12

NRA, 563 F.3d at 857.
83 US 36 (1872).
14
Id at 79-80 .
15
Id at 82.
13
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the States.16 Judge O'Scannlain thought that this constitutional revolution fairly
invited a reconsideration of Cruikshank and Presser, and conducted an exhaustive
inquiry from Blackstone on forward, which concluded that the right to keep and
bear arms had been regarded as a fundamental right at the time of the American
Revolution, which had been carried forward through the Due Process Clause.
Judge Easterbrook was brusque in his rejection of the O’Scannlain authority,
preferring to rely on the decision of the Second Circuit in Maloney v Cuomo,17which
held that no constitutional challenge could be lodged against a New York Law that
forbade the use of “nunchakus” in the home.18 But the Per Curiam panel decision
(on which now Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor sat) never addressed
incorporation explicitly, but only concluded that the New York statute could pass
the traditional rational basis test for the Fourteenth Amendment that Justice Scalia
had in fact rejected in Heller. To my mind, Judge O’Scannlain was right to conclude
that nothing in the earlier decisions precluded the circuit courts to see how the
current Supreme Court construction of incorporation applied to the particular case.
He chose to apply the current framework in part because the entire incorporation
doctrine had been cast into utter confusion by SlaughterHouse. Unlike Easterbrook,
he did not think he usurped any Supreme Court prerogatives to offer his best
opinion on an issue which he well knew will land in the lap of the Supreme Court. He
read the Supreme Court’s announcement in Heller that the case did not resolve the
incorporation question19 as an invitation to lower courts to consider the matter on
the merits, so as to let the high court benefit from its deliberations.
Easterbrook looks elsewhere to justify his decision to elevate the passive
virtues on this incorporation question. One of the worse of many bad Supreme Court
antitrust decisions of the 1960s was Albrecht v Herald Co,20 which had held, quite
inexcusably, that the antitrust laws imposed a per se rule against letting a publisher
16

See, eg, Butchers’ Union and Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v Crescent City Live-Stock
Landing and Slaughter-House Co, 111 US 746, 750 (1884)(using Due Process to replace Privileges or
Immunities).
17
554 F3d 556 (2d Cir 2009).
18
N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01.
19
NRA, 567 F3d at 858, citing Heller, 128 S Ct at 2813, note 23.
20
390 US 145 (1968).
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set maximum price restraints on its distributors. When a challenge to Albrecht came
to the Seventh Circuit in Khan v. State Oil Co.,21 Judge Posner (on a panel on which
Easterbrook did not sit) eviscerated the decision but refused to overrule it, citing
the need to respect his role as the judge on an inferior court. His advocacy was
promptly rewarded when Supreme Court unanimously overruled Albrecht the next
year, thanking the Seventh Circuit for its patience.22 That decision could have set the
pattern for Easterbrook to understand his role while voicing his opinions on the
merits.
There is also the further question of whether judges on inferior courts should
use antitrust cases as a template for constitutional litigation. As a matter of general
atmospherics, the gap between a technical antitrust issue and hot bottom
constitutional issue looks large. Just look at how the two cases tee up. According to
Easterbrook, the great flaw of Albrecht was that it failed to consider how consumer
welfare could be advanced by these maximum price limitations. This is no small
matter in antitrust law. But compare transformation in constitutional theory
between Cruikshank and Presser on the one hand and Heller one the other are not
accurately measured by some missed line of argument. Rather, this differences
represents a full scale constitutional revolution that invoked a different portion of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, whose substantive contours
did not start to develop until at least a generation after SlaughterHouse.23 Since that
time, moreover, we have moved from the world of selective incorporation under
Palko v. Connecticut24 which was overruled by the Warren Court decision in Benton
v. Maryland,25 which adopted the present test which requires incorporation of those
rights without which “a fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible.”
Judge O’Scannlain did not pause to worry about institutional role when he
offered his defense of incorporation. Easterbrook, however, was wholly unfazed by
the constitutional revolution. Far from going into a detailed historical argument, he
21

93 F3d 1358 (7th Cir 2009).
State Oil Co v Khan, 522 US 3 (1997).
23
See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
24
302 US 319 (1937)(denying incorporation of double jeopardy protection of Fifth Amendment).
25
395 US 784 (1969).
22
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contents himself with the observation that incorporating the Second Amendment
under Heller is in fact a more questionable step than the overruling of Khan. He
notes that incorporation of the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment
still remains selective, and that neither the Third Amendment, involving the
quartering of soldiers, nor the Seventh Amendment, requiring jury trials in actions
at common law for more than $20, has been applied to the states. He does so
without mentioning, however, that one year before Benton, the Due Process Clause
was read, in Duncan v Louisiana to require the use of a jury in state criminal cases.26
Easterbrook also noted that incorporation status has been denied to the Fifth
Amendment requirement of Grand Jury indictment or Presentment, or the Eighth
Amendment prohibition on excessive bail.27
It is instructive to note that Judge O’Scannlain considered none of these
particular provisions, but directed his exclusive attention to an exhaustive
examination of the historical treatment of the right to keep and bear arms in both
England and the United States. That approach does appear to be more consistent
with the general rule in Benton, which Easterbrook, however, dismisses as a case
that itself “paid little heed to history.”28 At this point, Easterbrook could have called
a halt to his opinion, for there is no reason for him to consider the underlying merits
of the matter once his role as a judge on an inferior court remains clear.
Nonetheless, Easterbrook does not take the austere line, but without missing a beat
continues to discuss the substantive issue in a way intended to widen the gulf
between himself and O’Scannlain. My best guess is that he thinks that incorporation
is the likely Supreme Court result, even though he would rule otherwise. Putting the
pieces together is a fascinating inquiry.
II. DOES

THE

SECOND AMENDMENT BIND

THE

STATES History and Text In

approaching this question, Easterbrook well understands that he cannot prevail by
appealing to the limited scope of authority of inferior federal court judges.
Immediately, therefore, after his belittling of Benton, he launches into his own
26

See, eg, 391 US 145 (1968).
NRA, 567 F3d at 859.
28
Id at 859.
27
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account of the history, which is far briefer than that undertaken by O’Scannlain.
Indeed the contrast could not be more apparent. O’Scannlain, obviously under the
influence of the originalist view of constitutional interpretation, goes to great pains
to quote and analyze all the key texts that address the disputed right to keep and
bear arms. His decision in Nordyke quotes or refers to Blackstone with approval
some 28 times, while weaving together a web that shows the fundamentality of the
right to keep and bear arms to the American Revolution. In so doing, he
conscientiously gave Blackstone the same pride of place that the Supreme Court had
attached to it in Duncan, which pertains to the right to a jury trial,29 and of course in
Heller itself, which refers to Blackstone. O’Scannlain’s historical effort is not entirely
successful because many of the passages he quotes from the revolutionary period
could be sensibly read as showing a resentment of the efforts of the British
government to restrain the use of arms in the colonies. That surely applies to the
quotations that deal with the opposition to “royal infringements” of colonial
prerogatives.30
Nonetheless at this point, Easterbrook, whose own strong brand of
textualism is averse to these historical exercises, puts Blackstone into his place by
noting that all of his English speculations deal with political and not constitutional
rights, given the British practice of parliamentary supremacy.31 And he continues his
denigration of Blackstone by noting that Blackstone regarded fixed sentences as a
bulwark of individual liberty, a position that has been roundly rejected by the
Supreme Court. But surely his belittling of Blackstone proves too much in light of the
extensive, if selective, Supreme Court reliance on Blackstone’s work. What is
therefore required is a closer examination of his particular views on this question to

29

Nordyke, 563 F3d at 449 (noting how in Duncan the Supreme Court “cit[ed] the English Declaration and
Bill of Rights, Blackstone's Commentaries, early state constitutions, and other evidence from the Founding
era”).
30
Id at 452. O’Scannlain also notes that many academics have taken the view that the introductory clause
makes reference to “the security of a free State,” to stress the state independence from the federal
government, Nordyke, 563 F3d at 450-51 & note 10, which Justice Scalia (unconvincingly in my view)
tries to avoid by rewriting that language to refer to “security of a free polity,” Heller, 182 S Ct at 2800,
thereby deemphasizing the federalist angle.
31
NRA, 567 F3d 859.
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see the extent to which they are congruent with Heller, which of course cited
Blackstone profusely. That single fact suggests that the O’Scannlain approach is
more in tune with the Supreme Court on this substantive issue than that of
Easterbrook, who shows no reluctance to deviate from the current Supreme Court’s
preferred interpretive practices.
The waters are, as ever, muddied by the further complication that the
relevant date for assessing any argument on incorporation is 1868, with the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. But the point seems incorrect for two
reasons. First, as Judge O’Scannlain observes, there is strong evidence that the
drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment also read their Blackstone and took the same
favorable attitude to the right to keep and bear arms as did the framers of the
Second Amendment.32 That point does not go to the question of whether the right to
keep and bear arms deserves the title of a fundamental right, but whether
incorporation was achieved through one or another of the clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. At this point, the weaknesses of Scalia’s Heller decision become more
apparent. By reading out the initial clause, Scalia has knocked the props out from
the structuralist claim that the Second Amendment was intended to protect the state
militias against federal overriding, without limiting their power for internal
regulation.
On this point, moreover, Cruikshank and Presser show just how difficult it is
for any judge or justice to make the relevant judgments. As O’Scannlain notes, there
is some evidence to the effect that the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment were
concerned about the dangers that state governments would disarm their citizens.33

32

Nordyke, 563 F3d at 455-56: “Representative James Wilson, a supporter of the Fourteenth Amendment,
described Blackstone's scheme of absolute rights as synonymous with civil rights, in a speech in favor of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (a precursor to the Fourteenth Amendment). Similarly, Representative
Roswell Hart listed ‘the right of the people to keep and bear arms,’ among other rights, as inherent in a
‘republican government.’” Note too that the reference to a “republican government” echoes the language in
the body of the Constitution: “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government.” US Const art IV, § 4.
33
Nordyke, 563 F3d at 456. “While the generation of 1789 envisioned the right as a component of local
resistance to centralized tyranny, whether British or federal, the generation of 1868 envisioned the right as
RAE Easterbrook NRA
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That fear seemed far‐fetched in Cruikshank, to say the least, where white gangs
appeared to operate with the implicit blessing of state authorities to terrorize the
newly freed black citizens in their exercise of their individual rights. The elaborate
discussion in the case to the effect that nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment
interfered with the state’s right and duty to protect the civil rights of its citizens
appears naïve given that only the federal government was prepared to protect black
citizens from abuses or indifference by local officials.
In contrast, in Presser, the practical dispute was whether Illinois could punish
members of a group known as Lehr & Wehr Verein (A union to teach and defend)
that wanted to organize its own paramilitary group in Illinois, which could have
easily been viewed as a threat to the liberty and property of other individuals within
the state. As noted earlier, Presser pushed hard on the structural view of the Second
Amendment, going so far as to hold that the provisions that allowed the state to
disarm the group was constitutional, even if they had to be severed from other
portions of the statute.34
Cruikshank and Presser thus tell very different tales about the operation of
local militias outside the direct control of the state. In Cruikshank the passive
behavior of the state officials in reconstruction Louisiana meant that local groups
had taken steps to strip members of black groups from their right of keeping and
bearing arms. The refusal to incorporate the Second Amendment (along with all
other provisions of the Bill of Rights) thus left these individuals powerless to count
on the federal government to forestall abuse. The entire episode showed why the
Fourteenth Amendment included section 5, which allowed for the Congressional
enforcement of all citizens of the United States. Holding that the Second Amendment
did not apply to the states let the local forces of disruption have their way.
In contrast, in Presser, the diligent enforcement by state officials appears to
safeguard to protect individuals from oppressive or indifferent local governments. See Akhil Amar, [The
Bill of Rights, 1998), at 257-66.”
34

Presser, 116 US at 263-64 (1886)
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have protected state citizens against local abuse, so that in this case, the
incorporation of the Second Amendment could easily have blocked state
governments from disarming rascals who wanted to strip other citizens of their civil
rights. The threat of misconduct by fringe groups is a constant in both cases, and the
differential in responses of Louisiana and Illinois suggests that incorporation speaks
with two voices. It offers real benefits, as in Cruikshank, insofar as it allows the
federal government to protect the right of isolated racial minorities to keep and bear
arms. Yet by the same token, it would have hampered Illinois from dealing with its
own dissidents, depending on how broadly any police power protection to the basic
rule was read. We see here in microcosm the structural difficulty with the full
system of incorporation. We are never sure whether the constitutional protections
so afforded will help the guys in the white or the black hats.
Positive versus Natural Law Easterbrook does not deal with any of these
historical complexities, but instead launches into a digression on the structuralist
theme. At no point does he seek to link up the natural law strand of American
constitutionalism. Instead he invokes a crude positivism—the law is what the
sovereign says it is—that, on this point at least, works at cross‐currents with both
Heller and our broader constitutional traditions. His initial premise is that “the
second amendment protects only the interest of law‐abiding citizens. The recent
case that he cites to support this proposition is United States v. Jackson,35 that quite
sensibly denies that any individual has a constitutional right to keep guns in hand
when distributing illegal drugs. That decision of course falls within the narrowest
conception of the police power, which has always prohibited the use of force to
assist in criminal activity, which drug distribution surely is.
Jackson does not, however, raise the salient question which is whether the
state may manipulate its definitions of lawful conduct in whatever way it sees fit.
Thus Easterbrook first asks whether the militia clause would prohibit the
ownership of long guns but not handguns, but offers no answer to his own query. He
35

555 F3d 635 (7th Cir 2009).
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then switches to a much more controversial hypothetical whereby a state decides
“that people cornered in their homes must surrender rather than fight back—in
other words that burglars should be deterred by the criminal law rather than self‐
help.”36 He regards this hypothetical as a hard case because he thinks that the state
may alter the law of self‐defense in whatever fashion it sees fit. But, if so, then
suppose the state insists that all individuals have to rely on police enforcement,
even if they must let others kill them in the home or on the streets, rather than risk
the possibility of harming some third person, or even the assailant himself. At this
point, he runs smack into a long tradition dating back to Hobbes, if not earlier, that
treats the right of self‐preservation as the primary natural right that no state can
restrict, even if it wanted to.37 After all, the worst punishment for self‐defense would
be death, so that the rational victim would always take his chances on resistance if
the law were valid.38
The harder question is whether any man could ever be put to that grim
choice under the Constitution. Justice Scalia’s view of the matter in Heller seems to
preclude that horrific possibility by observing quite simply that “the inherent right
of self‐defense has been central to the Second Amendment right,”39 and further that
the nature of this specific guarantee is not bounded by the low rational basis test.40
What possible sense does it make to provide a constitutional protection to keep and
bear arms that the state can negate by statute that eviscerates the rights of self‐
defense? One may as well say that the adoption of the Alien and Sedition Act trumps
the constitutional protections for freedom of speech and the press, or that private
property can be occupied in perpetuity by strangers so long as the state says that no
individual is entitled to remove trespassers from his own land. The only the way to
conduct this constitutional inquiry is against the natural law background that
prominently permeated the debates of 1868 as it did those of 1791.
36

NRA, 567 F3d at 859.
See, eg, Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ch 14 “A man’s covenant not to defend himself is void.”((1651)
Michael Oakeshott ed 1962).
38
Id.
39
Heller, 128 S Ct at 2817.
40
Heller, 128 S Ct at 2818 n.27.
37
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Judge Easterbrook senses, perhaps, that he is on thin ice when he notes, quite
correctly, that the common law rules of self‐defense are not immutable, but can be
varied “by requiring people to retreat when possible, and to use non‐lethal force
when retreat is not possible.”41 But no one questions the efforts to tweak the rules in
ways that respect the integrity of the person while seeking to prevent unnecessary
harms to others. Nor does it help in this context to observe with respect to these
variations that the optimal use of guns is a hotly disputed empirical question, which
is not presented in NRA.42 Just about everyone understands that the common law of
self‐defense is necessarily subject to both evolution in its details and to variation
across states. In addition to the retreat theme, other rules of criminal and civil
liability restrict the use of lethal force in defense of property. But one can look high
and low in both the civil and criminal law of self‐defense without finding a single
statute or case that abrogates the right of self‐defense in the face of deadly force. It
is that core of the self‐defense right that is inconsistent with Easterbrook’s explicit
positivism.
The concern with total abrogation is not unique to the Second Amendment.
The workers’ compensation laws in all states limit the common law cause of action,
but they do not abolish it altogether. Every workers’ compensation action preserves
the tort action in cases of criminal conduct, and they supply a statutory remedy in
those cases where the tort cause of action for negligence is abrogated. Indeed, the
key Supreme Court decision affirming their constitutionality, New York Central R.R.
v. White,43 explicitly stressed this quid pro quo rationale by noting that workers
compensation substituted a limited but certain remedy for a risky negligence action
promising high damages. Both of these features are key to upholding the
constitutionality of the statute, and this same logic carried over to sustain the
constitutionality of the automobile no‐fault statutes over 50 years later.44 There is
41

NRA, at 859.
NRA at 860.
43
243 US 188 (1916).
44
See, eg, Pinnick v Cleary, 271 NE2d 592 (Mass 1971), which notes that the Massachusetts no-fault
statute, c 670, which limited the right to sue in tort, did not impact any fundamental rights protected by the
first ten amendments of the Constitution.
42
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quite simply no precedent that allows the state to just eliminate all forms of self‐
protection
Incorporation Easterbrook’s last point addresses, albeit briefly, the ultimate
issue in the case, the incorporation of the Second Amendment through the
Fourteenth in the wake of the SlaughterHouse Cases, which eviscerated the
incorporation through Privileges or Immunities. Early on in his opinion,
Easterbrook mentions in passing that the plaintiffs raised the possibility of
overruling that decision, which no circuit could do. But even if that could be done, it
would still be necessary to show that the right to keep and bear arms counts as a
fundamental liberty under the clause. The most authoritative enumeration of those
rights prior to 1868 is the list of privileges and immunities offered by Bushrod
Washington in Corfield v. Coryell45 which covers a lot of ground but does not include
the right to bear arms on its list. Corfield is, of course, not conclusive in light of the
subsequent evolution of Supreme Court doctrine with its stress on the preservation
of fundamental individual rights against government intrusion.
Easterbrook does not wade into these difficulties, but instead seeks to slow
down the incorporation bandwagon by invoking Justice Brandeis’s famous dissent
in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann46: “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest
of the country.”47 That passage supports the proposition that decentralized
authorities pose less threat to the liberties of ordinary people than a single national
government. But its application to this current problem is highly doubtful. Brandeis
wrote his aphorism before the 1937 Supreme Court revolution expanded the scope
of the Commerce Clause so that it covered all economic activities, no matter how
local they might appear.48 At this point the laboratory image collides with the
implicit premise of the modern commerce clause cases, which trumpet
45

6 F Cas 546 (E D Pa 1823)
285 US 262 (1932).
47
Id at 311.
48
See, National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co, 301 US 1 (1937).
46
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comprehensive uniformity as the goal, even as their inevitable indirect, cross‐border
effects undercut any laboratory argument. At best, the Brandeis insight operates to
create a default provision against the federal intervention in internal state activities
in the absence of a clear statement to the contrary in any federal law.49
More to the point, New Ice had nothing at all to do with incorporation. Its
underlying issue was whether Oklahoma could by statute allow its state corporation
commission to issue permits for the “manufacture, sale, or distribution, of ice,” only
when it found that the existing licensed facilities were not sufficient to meet local
demand, “except on proof of necessity.” New Ice thus let states protect incumbent
firms against new competition. In this last pre‐New Deal decision, Justice Sutherland
struck a low against the state creation of monopolies or cartels. But the props under
his position were effectively dashed with the Court’s decision in Nebbia v New York50
which upheld an anticompetitive criminal statute that set minimum prices for milk. I
agree with Justice Sutherland that there is little or no reason to allow the
experimentation in state cartels. But even Brandeis’s view accepted the
incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and only argued for a lenient standard
of review. New Ice could never be cited to block the incorporation of the Second
Amendment. Nor could it be used to promote the rational basis standard now used
to decide challenges to economic regulation under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, given that Heller has embraced some, as yet undefined,
higher standard of review. I very much doubt that mentioning four provisions of the
Bill of Rights that are not incorporated will slow down any Supreme Court justice
who thinks that Heller was rightly decided. Easterbrook did not elaborate on his
brief suggestion given his believe that these matters “are for the justices rather than
a court of appeals.”51 But it is highly unlikely that his straws into the wind will
survive Judge O’Scannlain’s gale force arguments for incorporation.

49

See, eg, Gregory v Ashcroft, 501 US 452 (1990)(adopting a “plain statement” principle to avoid potential
constitutional collisions).
50
291 U.S. 502 (1934).
51
NRA, 563 F3d 860.
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CONCLUSION Let me state a few words to place NRA in a larger constitutional
framework. Both Easterbrook and O’Scannlain count, in some broad sense, as
conservative judges. But that similarity conceals the gulf that arises when the
former is standoffish to the originalist tradition that the latter embraces. This
contrast reveals just how unsympathetic Judge Easterbrook is to the new dominant
method of the Supreme Court. Left to his own devices, he would either ignore this
evidence or dwell on its limitations. In this regard, stare decisis notwithstanding, I
see no way that his cavalier dismissal of Blackstone and similar luminaries can be
squared with the near reverence that these sources hold for justices on every side of
many constitutional questions.
In NRA, Easterbrook’s reticence derives from his deep belief in judicial
hierarchy. But unlike his powerhouse commercial and regulatory decisions, this
style will not make him an appellate court opinion leader in constitutional law. By
virtue of his conception of his role, NRA pales in comparison to his magnificent
opinion in American Booksellers Association v Hudnut52 that invalidated its
overbroad antipornography ordinance. In the end, it does not seem wise to try to
split the baby by cutting off substantive discussions by hiding behind the apparent
restrictions in the role of lower court judges. The better approach by far is to take
your best shot on the issue, and leave it for the Supreme Court to decide whether
you have misspoken.
Ironically, Judge Easterbrook should have followed the Posner strategy in
Khan by first announcing that he would deny incorporation, and then offering his
complete analysis of the case on the merits. Half measures don’t work. The Supreme
Court would have been ideally positioned to decide this case if Judge Easterbrook
had decided to join issue by taking on Judge O’Scannlain’s decision in Nordyke. The
lesson of NRA is to beware of a half‐hearted commitment to judicial restraint.

52

771 F2d 323 (7th Cir 1985).
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Readers with comments should address them to:
Richard A. Epstein
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
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